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PICKETING
Picketing may be defined, generally, as a means by which
an employee or a group of employees, or a labor organiza-
tion, seeks to gain the sympathy of the employees of a par-
ticular industry, trade, or business and of the public, to a
certain objective of the picketers. This objective may mani-
fest itself either in an increase in wages, adjustment in the
number of working hours, unionization, or betterment of
working conditions. Pickets may utilize various means of
publicizing their aims. The two most common methods are
oral persuasion and the use of placards, signs, and handbills.
In order to fully understand the present law of picketing,
a cursory examination of the labor laws and tendencies of
the early English and American courts is necessary. In Eng-
land a workingman struggling to improve his condition, was
confronted until 1918 with laws limiting the amount of
wages which he might demand.' Until 1824, he was punish-
able as a criminal if he combined with his fellow workmen to
raise wages or shorten hours, or to affect the business in any
way, even if there was no intent to resort to a strike.2 Until
the year 1871, members of a union who joined in persuading
employees to leave work were liable criminally, even though
the employees were not under contract and the persuasion
was both peaceful and unattended by picketing; also, threat-
ening to strike was a criminal act.' Not until four years later
was the right of workers to combine for the purpose of attain-
ing their ends, conceded in full. In 1875, Parliament declared
that workmen combining in furtherance of a trade dispute
should not be indictable for criminal conspiracy unless the
1 53 GEo. 111, c. 40; See also the STATUTES or LABORERS, 25 Edw. Ill, c.
1-7 (1351); 5 Euz. c. 4; 1 JAC. 1, c. 6.
2 5 GEO. 4, c. 95; The King v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge, 8 Modem
10; WRIamT, THE LAW OP CaMMAL CONSPIRACIrES.
8 CRMWAL LAw A[ENDMENT ACT, 34 & 35 Vic. c. 32, § 1 (1871); Skinner
v. Kitch, 10 Cox C. C. 493, L. R. 2 Q. B. 393 (1867).
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act done by one person was indictable as a crime.4 After the
promulgation of that statute, a combination of workmen to
effect the ordinary objects of a strike was no longer a crim-
inal offense. But picketing, although peaceful, in promoting a
strike, was held to be illegal.' Not until 1906 was the ban on
peaceful picketing and the use of pressure by a secondary
strike or boycott on the employer, removed by the Trade Dis-
putes Act.6 In the United States, however, the legal right of
workingmen to combine and strike in order to secure for
themselves higher wages, shorter hours and better working
conditions received early recognition.7 But there was a great
diversity of opinion as to the means by which, and upon
whom pressure might be exerted in order to induce the em-
ployer to yield to the demands of the employee.
The great doctrinal controversy relating to picketing, clas-
sifies the jurisdiction into three groups. Illinois adopted the
view that all picketing was illegal, irregardless of whether it
was peaceful and carried on without intimidation.8 The court
axgued that picketing was an invasion of the employer's and
the non-picketing employee's interests, and hence would lead
to violence and threats; therefore, all picketing must be en-
joined. The Federal District Court in Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway v. Gee,9 came to the same conclusion, but
by a different line of reasoning. They maintained that the
picketing of a premise during an industrial conflict was law-
ful intimidation. This view was shared by Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, and Washington.' ° Later, California and Illinois
4 THE CONSPIRACY & .PROTECTION OF PROPERTY AcT, 38 & 39 Vic. c. 86, § 3
(1875).
5 38 & 39 Vic. c. 86, § 7; Lyons v. Wilkins [1896] 1 Ch. 811, 826, 831.
6 6 EDW. VII, c. 47, § 2.
7 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1
(1870).
8 Lyon & Healy v. Piano Workers Union, 289 Ill. 176, 124 N. E. 443 (1919).
But see Shuster v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N. E.
(2d) 50 (1937).
9 139 Fed. 582 (C. C. S. D. Iowa, 1905).
10 Pierce v. Stableman's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909); Hotel &
Rest. Emp. v. Stathakis, 135 Ark. 86, 205 S. W. 450 (1918); Robison v. Hotel
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modified and lined up with Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Washing-
ton, in holding that peaceful picketing is lawful."
Before delving into the judicial determinations, it would
be best to consider the legislative movements in respect to
picketing. The policy of suppression in England, has cropped
up in this country in the nature of statutes making it a crime
to picket or loiter about any business to dissuade others from
becoming or remaining customers or employees. Alabama, 2
Colorado,'" Kansas,' 4 Nebraska,'3 Utah, 6 and Hawaii,'7
have passed such laws. Besides the statutes, certain city ordi-
nances forbidding picketing have been enacted at one time
or another in a few states.'" The law, in twenty-one of the
& Rest. Emp., 35 Idaho 418, 207 Pac. 132 (1922); Ellis v. Journeymen Barbers'
Union, 194 Iowa 1179, 191 N. W. 111 (1922); Bull v. International Alliance, 119
Kan. 713, 241 Pac. 459 (1925); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077
(1896); Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 91 N. J. Eq.
240, 109 Atl. 147 (1920); Beck v. Railway Teamster's Protective Union, 118
Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1888); Danz v. American Federation of Musicians, 133
Wash. 186, 233 Pac. 630 (1925).
11 Southern Cal. Iron & Steel Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 186 Cal. 604, 200
Pac. 1 (1921); Jones v. Van Winkle Machine Works, 131 Ga. 336, 62 S. E. 236
(1908); Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated, etc., Union, 165 Ind. 421, 430,
75 N. E. 877 (1905); Shuster v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 293 Il1. App.
177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50 (1937); Steffes v. Motion Picture Union. 136 Minn. 200,
161 N. W. 524 (1917). See also Minn. Laws 1917, c. 493; St. Louis v. Gloner,
210 Mo. 502, 109 S. W. 30 (1908); Riggs v. Cincinnati Waiters, 5 Ohio N. P.
336, 8 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 565 (1922); White Mountain Freezer Co. v. Murphy,
78 N. H. 398, 101 Atl. 357 (1917); Mills v. U. S. Printing Co. 99 App. Div. 605,
aff'd, 199 N. Y. 76, 92 N. E. 214 (1910); Hydrox Ice Cream v. John Doe, 289
N. Y. S. 683 (1936); In Re Sweitzer, 13 Okla. Cr. Rep. 151, 162 Pac. 1134 (1917);
Starr v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Workers' Union, 63 Pac. (2d) 1104 (Ore. 1936) ;
Kimbel v. Lumber & Saw Mill Workers Union et al., 65 Pac. (2d) 1066 (Wash.
1937); American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of T. C., 268 N. W. 250 (Wis. 1936);
Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, 105 Va. 188, 53 S. E.
273 (1906); UTAH LAWS OF 1917, c. 68.
12 A.A. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1928) c. 91, § 3448.
13 COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 464; Col. Stats. Ann. (1935) c. 97, § 90.
14 KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 44, art. 617; KA.. GEN. STAT. (1935)
c. 44, art. 6, §§ 44-620; State v. Personett, 114 Kan. 680, 220 Pac. 520 (1923).
15 NF. Com,. STAT. (1929) c. 28, §§ 28-813.
16 Utah Laws (1919) c. 19, §§ 1-2; repealed by Laws of 1937, c. 58.
17 HAw AI REV. LAWS (1925) § 4360, p. 1923.
18 People v. Armentrout, 1 Pac. (2d) 556 (Cal. Crim. App. 1931); Watters
v. Indianapolis, 191 Ind. 671, 134 N. E. 482 (1922); Ex parte Stout, 82 Tex. Cr.
App. 183 (1917).
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remaining twenty-eight states having statutes dealing with
picketing, despite the diverse phraseology, is that picketing
is lawful if it does not tend to intimidate or use any means
of force.' 9
The usual determinations in considering the status of pick-
eting are: Is it for a legal purpose, and, Is it carried on by
legal means? An injunction will issue if either the purpose or
the means employed to attain that purpose are found to be
in any way unlawful.2" The old view still adhered to by a
minority of states is that all picketing should be regarded as
unlawful, and should be enjoined without regard to the pur-
pose or means."' The idea behind this opinion is stated in a
frequently quoted passage by Mr. Justice Mc Pherson, in the
Atchison case:"
"There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing any more
than there can be chaste vulgarity, or reasonable mobbing, or lawful
lynching. When men want to converse or persuade they do not organ-
ize a picket line. When they only want to see who are at work, they
go and see and then leave, and disturb no one physically or mentally."
Another case, namely, Schwartz & Jaffee v. Hillman,2" said
that peaceful picketing exists mostly in the imagination.
Courts have expressed a marked diversity and contrariety
of opinions as to what constitutes a lawful purpose to picket.
The courts have generally held that certain subjects of indus-
trial dispute are lawful ones, and have permitted picketing
19 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Mlissouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The
N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) § 2: 29- 77, may be taken as typical. "No restraining
order or injunction shall be granted in any case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute, enjoining any person or persons, singly or in concert, from quitting
employment, or from peacefully, and without intimidation, persuading others to
do so, or from peacefully, and without intimidation being on public ways to pub-
licize the dispute, and peacefully and without intimidation persuading any person
to work or abstain from working. .. "
20 OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICTS 938, 939.
21 supra note 10.
22 139 Fed. 582, 584 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1905); see also Keith Theatre v.
Vachon, 187 At. 692 (Me. 1936).
23 115 Misc. 61, 189 N. Y. S. 21 (1921).
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where the object is to maintain or increase wages,24 lessen
the number of working hours,25 or to secure better working
conditions.2" The courts seem to be hopelessly divided as to
whether the closed shop is a legitimate subject of industrial
dispute. New York,27 Illinois,2 8 California,29 Minnesota, 0
and other states 1 have held such a strike legal; while Mas-
sachusetts, 2 Pennsylvania,"s and New Jersey 4 have held
otherwise. Strikes to secure recognition of the union, to force
discharge of non-union men, or to effect a closed shop have
been held illegal; and courts, in a majority of cases, have
maintained that because of the tendency to give union labor
a monopoly, it is not legitimate.3 5 In Sarmos et al. v. Nouris
et al.,8 the court said:
"The real object of the strike being as I have said to compel the
complainants to unionize their business by subjecting it to control and
domination by the labor organization, an object which the. law does
not recognize as legitimate, the complainants are entitled to protection
against the continued picketing of their place of business by the de-
24 Jefferson & Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks, 287 Pa. 171, 134 Atl. 430 (1927);
American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 25 U. S. 184 (1921);
Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912); N. J. Painting Co.
v. Local No. 26, 95 N. J. Eq. 108, 122 Atl. 622 (1923).
25 Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380, Cooks' and Waiters' Union, 19 Ariz. 379,
171 Pac. 121 (1918); Carter v. Oster, 134 Mo. App. 146, 112 S. W. 995 (1908).
26 Cornnellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfr's Asso., 221 Mass. 554, 109 N. E. 643
(1915); Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919).
27 Exchange Bakery and Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E.
130 (1927).
28 Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 IMI. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912).
29 Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909).
30 Grant Construction Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167,
161 N. W. 520 (1917).
81 Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, 92 Conn. 161, 101 AtI.
659 (1917); Jetton Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907);
Roddy v. United Mine Workers, 41 Okla. 621, 139 Pac. 126 (1914); Clemmitt v.
Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38, 42 N. E. 367 (1895).
32 Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011 (1900).
33 Bausbach v. Recff, 244 Pa. 559, 91 AUt. 224 (1914).
84 Ruddy v. Plumbers, 79 N. J. L. 467, 75 Atl. 742 (1910).
35 Moore v. Cooks' etc. Union, 39 Cal. App. 538, 179 Pac. 417 (1919);
Nusbaum v. Retail Clerks' International Protective Asso., 227 Ill. App. 206,
(1922); Goyette v. C. V. Watson Co., 245 Mass. 577, 140 N. E. 285 (1923);
George Grant Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 161
N. W. 520 (1917); Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Local No. 560, 91 N. J. Eq. 240,
109 Atl. 147 (1920).
86 15 Del. Ch., 391, 138 At]. 607, 611 (1927).
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fendants or their agents. This being true, the picketing which has been
going on is unlawful, whether peaceful or otherwise. I am not, there-
fore, called upon to go into the question of whether picketing if peace-
fully conducted is permissible in labor controversies, for if the object
of the picketers is unlawful, picketing of all kinds is likewise so."
Certain factual differentiations have been made in the elab-
orate treatment of this problem in the TExAs LAW REVIEW 37
where it is stated:
"In order to fully comprehend the problem we should bear in mind
the different factual set-ups in which it can present itself, viz., (1)
where the employees strike to secure the adoption of the principles of
the closed shop; (2) where the employees, aided by the union, strike
to obtain the institution of a closed shop agreement; and (3) where
the union, having no connection with the employees, calls a strike to
force the employer to adopt a closed shop agreement."
The preferable and perhaps majority rule, holds that the
purpose is legal when the employees strike, without the aid
of a union, to secure the closed shop. 8 The objective of such
a strike would ordinarily be for the betterment of the condi-
tions of the worker, either in the matter of hours, wages, or
better working conditions. This view is best seen in a New
Jersey case " where the court offered:
"The principle of the closed shop, i. e., the monopolization of the
labor market has found no judicial sponsor. In whatever form organ-
ized labor has asserted it, whether to the injury of employer, or to
labor, or to labor unions outside of the fold, the judiciary of the coun-
try has responded uniformly that it is inimical to the freedom of in-
dividual pursuit guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land, and
contravenes public policy. On the other hand, public policy favors free
competition, and the courts have been keen to recognize the right of or-
ganized labor to compete for work and wage and economic and social
betterment, and to use its weapon, the strike, to realize its lawful as-
37 Goodrich, Injunction Against Picketing in Labor Disputes (1937) 15 T"x.
L. REV. 344, 350.
38 Jetton-Dekle Lumber Co. v. Mather, 53 Fla. 969, 43 So. 590 (1907);
Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316 (1911); Lehigh Structural Steel
Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Ref. Works, 92 N. J. Eq. 131, 111 Atl. 376 (1920);
Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, etc., 301 U. S. 468 (1937); Shuster v.
International Ass'n of Machinists, 293 Ill. App. 177, 12 N. E. (2d) 50 (1937);
Barraclough, et a]. v. Local Joint Executive Board, etc. (Superior ct. of Cal.
1938).
39 Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Ref. Works, 92 N. J.
Eq. 131, 11 Atl. 376 (1920).
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pirations, but none has gone to the'length of sanctioning a strike for
a closed shop, which has for its object the exclusion from work of
workmen who are not members of the organization."
Where the employees, aided by the union, strike for the
adoption of a closed shop, the majority and most reasonable
rule is that it is not lawful.4" The same determination has
been reached where the union, apart from its employees, calls
a strike to secure a closed shop.4' In Keith Theatre v. Va-
chon,42 the plaintiff, lessee and operator of Keith's theatre
complains in equity against certain men and unions, and
seeks injunctive relief from the picketing of his theatre by
the defendants, their agents and servants. No agreements
were ever made with union representatives, and plaintiff con-
ducted his theatre as an open shop, with wages lower than
those required by the union, but as much as he could possibly
pay. The plaintiff's employees were satisfied, but these out-
siders started picketing "for the sole purpose of compelling
plaintiff to adopt the closed shop and the union schedule of
wages." An injunction was granted, and Mr. Judge Hudson
said:43
"What justification or excuse is there for such interference? The de-
fendants cannot justify as agents of the plaintiff's employees, for they
had no authority. Their belief that it would be better for these em-
ployees to join the union, even if true, gives them no right to compel
the employees to accept such an alleged betterment. We do not think
it equitable to compel the employees and their employer, all satisfied
that no wrong exists between them, to adopt and put into effect the
desire of these defendants, who have no property or contractual rights
to lose, as have the employer and its employees, if the injunction be
denied. This court should neither deprive a laborer of his lawful em-
ployment nor force him to join a union at the behest of them who by
some courts are called 'intermeddlers'."
The same court also said:
"Social welfare does not demand that non-related persons or or-
ganizations shall have the right, even by peaceful picketing, to attempt
40 Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457 (1908); Cooks', Waiters'
& Waitresses' Local Union v. Papageorge, 230 S. W. 1086 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
41 Keith Theatre v. Vachon, 187 Atl. 692 (Me. 1936); Hitchman Coal &
Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917).
42 Keith Theatre v. Vachon, 187 Atl. 692, 698 (Me. 1936).
43 id. at 702.
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to break down and destroy a satisfactory relationship between an em-
ployer and its employees in order to supplant it by another whose
terms are satisfactory only to the dictators of it."
A fine distinction is propounded by the New Jersey courts
on this doctrine. They say that picketing for a closed shop in
a single factory is legal, but where the purpose of the picket-
ing is to create a monopoly of labor in an entire industry, it
is illegal. Also, where the motive of picketing in an entire
industry is not to create such a monopoly, but is of a self-
preservative nature, then it is legal." In recapitulation, if a
strike is precipitated for the paramount purpose of improv-
ing wages, working conditions or shortening of hours, it is
without doubt,.for a lawful object.
The next consideration is whether or not the means of
picketing are lawful. The purpose, already regarded, may be
legal, yet if the means are not, the courts will in accord,
frown upon all activity. The doctrine is now well settled that
picketing, if it is permitted at all, becomes unlawful, when
subject to violence or intimidation; and all the jurisdictions
where picketing is permissible are unanimous in maintaining
that picketing to be lawful, must be peaceful. 5 The guide
for distinguishing between peaceful and intimidating conduct
has run the gamut, in decisions, from one extreme to another.
In 1921, the United States Supreme Court passed upon
the legality of picketing in the cases of American Steel Foun-
dries v. The Tri-City Trades Council," and in Truax v. Cor-
rigan." The attitude of the court in the first instance was
that not all picketing is necessarily lawful, but that it was
permissible for members of a striking organization to have
one picket at each entrance of the employer's plant to an-
nounce the purposes of the strike and to peaceably persuade
44 The Four Plating Co., Inc. v. Mako, 122 N. J. Eq. 298 (1937).
45 Rosen Western Slipper Manufacturing Co. v. United Shoe & Leather
Workers Union, Local 48, et al. 287 II. App. 49 (1936); Restful Slipper Co.,
Inc. v. United Shoe & Leather Union et al., 174 Atl. 543 (N. J. Eq. 1934).
46 251 U. S. 184 (1921).
47 257 U. S. 213 (1921).
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others to join them in the strike. In the Truax case, the court
held an Arizona statute legalizing mass picketing to be un-
constitutional. These cases are of great import in deciding
the subsequent holdings by the state courts.
Attendance in the general neighborhood of the employer's
place of business to spread information to those who resort
there for employment, that a strike is taking place, is re-
garded as lawful,4" and, it is even generally held that congre-
gating in numbers to persuade others not to work is lawful,4
as long as it is carried on so as not to intimidate those at
work or those seeking employment.5" Chief Justice Taft in
his opinion in the American Foundries case 51 said:
"If however, the offer is declined, as it may rightfully be, then per-
sistence, importunity, following and dogging become unjustifiable an-
noyance and obstruction which is likely soon to savor of intimidation."
At any rate, an injunction will readily be granted against
force, threats, violence, or intimidation on the part of pickets
in connection with a strike.52 Also, when the picketing results
in trespasses upon real or personal property, either actual or
threatened, it will be enjoined.5" In the case of International
Ticket Co. v. Wendrich, et al.,54 the complainant, engaged in
the printing of tickets in Newark, New Jersey, was visited by
individuals of the defendant labor unions who called a strike
to force complainant to adopt a closed shop. A large majority
48 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 247 Fed. 722 (S. D. N. Y. 1917);
Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Union, 165 Ind. 421, 75
N. E. 877 (1905); Michaels v. Hillman, 112 Misc. 395, 183 N. Y. Supp. 195
(1920); Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Asso., 59 N. J.
Eq. 49, 46 Atl. 208 (1899).
49 Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 246 Fed. 851 (D. C.
S. D. Ohio 1917); Albee & G. Co. v. Arei, 201 N. Y. 172 (1923); Keuffel &
Esser v. International Asso., 93 N. J. Eq. 429, 116 At. 9 (1922).
50 Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, 218 Mo. App. 516, 279 S. W. 232 (1926);
Forstmann & H. Co. v. United Front Committee, 133 Atl. 202 (N. J. Eq. 1926).
51 25 U. S. 184 (1921).
52 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Local Union v. Dorothy Frocks
Co., 97 S. W. (2d) 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Iron Molders' Union v. Allis
Chalmers Co., 166 Fed 45 (C. C. A. 7th, 1908); Gassaway v. Borderland Coal
Corp., 278 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921).
53 Scavenger Service Corporation v. Courtney, 85 Fed. (2d) 825 (C. C. A.
7th, 1936).
54 122 N. J. Eq. 222, 193 Atl. 808 (1937).
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of the employees walked out, the plant was picketed continu-
ously, and allegations of various acts of violence and intimi-
dation were supported by affidavits. As a result of their vio-
lence, one of the complainant's trucks was driven into the
Passaic River. The court held that an injunction would be
granted to enjoin labor unions from picketing an employer's
plant, as he had a property right in the services of his em-
ployee not to be infringed by outside influences and interfer-
ence. This was decided under a New Jersey statute " which
provides: "No restraining order or writ of injunction shall be
granted . . . in any case involving . . .any person or per-
sons .. . from peaceably .. .being upon any public street
. . . for the purpose of obtaining or communicating informa-
tion . . . or to peaceably and without threats or intimida-
tion persuade any person . . . to work or abstain from
working . . ." This court went still farther in saying, "It
is rarely that a case arises where picketing is free from un-
lawful conduct," also citing Truax v. Corrigan56 in that,
"'peaceful picketing' is a contradiction in terms."
To render picketing unlawful, it is unnecessary that it be
accompanied by actual physical violence;57 but it is suffi-
cient, if there is an appearance and presence of intimida-
tion, 8 or a threat of violence.59 The courts are definitely di-
vided, however, as to what constitutes intimidation. One
case 60 presents the view:
"That which is persuasion, argument, and entreaty at a man's fire-
side may easily become a threat and intimidation at the entrance of
the works at which he is employed. It is not alone what is actually
55 N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Supp. 1930) § 107-131 a.
50 257 U. S. 312, 340 (1921).
57 Humphreys Mfg. Co. v. Mathias, 12 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 517 (1902);
Jefferson & I Coal Co. v. Marks, 287 Pa. 171, 134 At. 430 (1926).
58 Schlang v. Ladies' Waist Makers' Union, 67 Misc. 221, 124 N. Y. Supp.
289 (1910).
59 Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881 (1894);
Robinson v. Bryant, 181 Ga. 722, 184 S. E. 298 (1936).
60 Brown Mfg. Co. v. Local Union No. 76, 12 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 753
(1902).
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said between parties that determines its meaning, but it is what is said,
taken in connection with the manner in which it is said, the demeanor
of the speakers, the environment of the parties, that gives what is said
classification and meaning. The question in such a case is not so much
what was actually said as what was understood by the parties to be
meant by what was said."
When ordinary peaceful picketing develops into, and be-
comes persistent, annoying the workmen, and making their
conditions miserable and intolerable, it becomes unlawful,
and can be enjoined. Intimidation may be presumed from the
number of people engaged in the activity,"' and therefore,
mass picketing may be said to be unlawful.2 The following
acts have been construed to amount to intimidation and are
summarily enjoinable: interference with employees who wish
to work,63 mass picketing, 4 and the carrying of a placard
bearing the sign, "A scab lives here." "
It is generally permissible to use placards, signs, and hand-
bills by pickets to accomplish their purpose, if they bear a
truthful statement of the facts involved.6 The rule in the
Federal Courts is that where there is a labor dispute it "indi-
cates that there is a disagreement and conflicting views. The
Federal Courts are prohibited from interfering with a full
and free advertising of those conflicting views." 67
The right of peaceful picketing is by no means a constitu-
tional right, and as has already been seen, it may be prohib-
01 Hoster Brewing Co. v. Giblin, 14 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 305 (1903); Rogers
v. Evarts, 17 N. Y. S. 264 (1891); Keuffel & Esser v. International Asso., 93
N. J. Eq. 429, 116 AtI. 9 (1922).
02 Forstmann & H. Co. v. United Front Committee, 99 N. J. Eq. 230, 133
At. 202 (1926); Union Table & Spring Co., Inc. v. Perlow, 93 N. Y. L. J. 892
(N. Y. 1935).
63 George Wallace Co. v. International Asso. of Mechanics, 63 Pac. (2d)
1090 (Ore. 1936).
64 Ohrbach's Affiliated Stores Inc. v. "Jane Doe" et al., (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1935).
65 State of Minnesota v. Archie Perry et al., 265 N. W. 302 (Minn. 1936).
GO Wise Shoe Co., Inc. v. Samuel S. Lowenthal, 266 N. Y. 264, 194 N. E.
749 (1935); The Driggs Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees'
etc., 49 Ohio App. 303, 197 N. E. 250 (1935).
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ited by statute or ordinance.68 A New York court held that
peaceful picketing approaches so closely to wrongful inter-
ference with the constitutional guarantee of individual secur-
ity of life and property that it can be done only under the
strictest limitation. 9 The constitutional right of free speech
has been held not to be violated by an ordinance forbidding
the use of the sidewalks for picketing,7 or by an ordinance
prohibiting picketing entirely.7 Such an ordinance has also
been held not to infringe the constitutional right of peaceable
assemblage and the use of the public streets, and it is not
class legislation."
David Allyn Gelber.
68 Hardie-Tynes Mfg. Co. v. Cruse, 189 Ala. 66, 66 So. 567 (1914); Thomas
v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550 (1924).
69 Yates Hotel Co. v. Meyers, 195 N. Y. S. 558 (1922).
70 Ex parte Stout, 82 Tex. Cr. Rep. 183, 198 S. W. 967 (1917).
7' Thomas v. Indianapolis, 195 Ind. 440, 145 N. E. 550 (1924).
